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The Inadequate Protection of Human Rights in Unfair Dismissal Law 
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Abstract 
Workers in the private sector have limited legal options if they believe that, by terminating the 
working relationship, the employer has infringed their human rights. In most cases, they must 
rely on an existing cause of action, notably the right not to be unfairly dismissed contained in 
the Employment Rights Act 1996. The provisions of the Human Rights Act 1998 reinforce the 
argument that unfair dismissal law should play a role in the vindication of human rights in the 
employment context. Is the law of unfair dismissal capable of fulfilling this role? This article 
will argue that it is not. It will demonstrate that there are several major obstacles to the 
vindication of a worker’s human rights through unfair dismissal law. It will be argued that there 
are three ways in which the law of unfair dismissal is inconsistent with the principles of the 
European Convention on Human Rights: the narrow personal scope of protection, the lax 
standard of review applied by the tribunals, and the inadequate remedies available to claimants 
who are successful in their claim.  
 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
Employers have demonstrated a propensity to take decisions that infringe the human rights of 
their workers. With unfortunate regularity, workers are dismissed for reasons that are 
connected with an exercise of their fundamental rights: for example, due to their association 
with a controversial political party,1 because the manner in which they manifest their religious 
beliefs does not fit with the company’s corporate image2 or as a result of their activities outside 
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1 Redfearn v Serco Ltd [2006] EWCA Civ 659, [2006] ICR 1367. For commentary, see Hugh Collins 
and Virginia Mantouvalou, ‘Redfearn v UK: Political Association and Dismissal’ (2013) 76 MLR 
909.  
2 See Eweida v British Airways Plc [2010] EWCA Civ 80, [2010] ICR 890; Chaplin v Royal Devon & 
Exeter Hospital NHS Foundation Trust [2010] ET 1702886/2009 and C-157/15 Samira Achbita and 
Centrum voor gelijkheid van kansen en voor racismebestrijding v G4S Secure Solutions NV [2017] 
IRLR 466. For commentary on freedom of religion in the workplace and Eweida and others v United 
Kingdom (2013) 57 EHRR 8, see Ronan McCrea, ‘Religion in the Workplace’ (2014) 77 MLR 277. 
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of work, such as their intimate life3 or social media presence.4 The loss of a job has severe 
consequences for any individual, damaging his or her financial resources as well as their 
reputation, self-esteem and opportunities for social interaction. Adding the affront of a human 
rights violation to such a situation only magnifies the distress and hurt that they experience. 
Ensuring that individuals in this position are able to challenge their employer’s wrongdoing 
and receive a remedy for a serious infringement with their human rights is therefore a pressing 
concern for labour law.5  
What legal mechanisms currently protect workers against unjustified interference with 
their human rights at work?  A worker in the public sector may make a claim against their 
employer for acting incompatibly with the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) 
under the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA 1998).6 Workers in the private sector must rely on 
existing labour law claims. Some human rights are specifically vindicated by employment law. 
For instance, the right not to be discriminated against is protected by the Equality Act 2010. 
Protection for whistleblowers was introduced by the Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998, as 
                                                           
3 See X v Y [2004] EWCA Civ 662, [2004] ICR 1634 and Pay v Lancashire Probation Service [2004] 
ICR 187. For commentary, see Astrid Sanders, ‘The Law of Unfair Dismissal and Behaviour outside 
Work’ (2014) 34 LS 328, Virginia Mantouvalou, ‘Human Rights and Unfair Dismissal: Private Acts 
in Public Spaces’ (2008) 71 MLR 912 and Virginia Mantouvalou and Hugh Collins, ‘Private Life and 
Dismissal’ (2009) 38 ILJ 133. 
4 Crisp v Apple Retail UK Ltd [2011] ET/1500258/11 and Game Retail Limited v Laws (2014) 
UKEAT/0188/14/DA. For commentary on free speech rights in the employment context, see Paul 
Wragg, ‘Free Speech Rights at work: Resolving the Differences between Practice and Liberal 
Principle’ (2015) 44 ILJ 1.  
5 This is reflected in the building literature regarding safeguarding human rights in the context of 
work: see for example the literature cited above, as well as Hugh Collins and Virginia Mantouvalou, 
‘Human Rights and the Contract of Employment’ in Mark Freedland (ed), The Contract of 
Employment (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), Alan Bogg and Keith Ewing, ‘The 
Implications of the RMT Case’ (2014) 43 ILJ 221, Astrid Sanders, ‘A "right" to legal representation 
(in the workplace) during disciplinary proceedings?’ (2010) 39 ILJ 166, Hugh Collins, ‘The 
Protection of Civil Liberties in the Workplace’ (2006) 69 MLR 619, and Keith Ewing, ‘The 
Implications of Wilson and Palmer’ (2003) 32 ILJ 1.  
6 See, for example, R. (on the application of G) v X School Governors [2011] UKSC 30, [2012] 1 AC 
167 with regard to Article 6 and the right to be legally represented in disciplinary proceedings.  
 3 
 
required by the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR).7 Similarly, 
Part III of the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992 protects workers 
from being subjected to detriment on the grounds that they choose to exercise their freedom to 
associate with a trade union.8 The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union may 
also be directly effective in the private employment relationship in a limited range of 
circumstances.9 If a worker’s complaint of an infringement of their fundamental right does not 
fit within the scope of these specific claims, the only option is bring other, more general claims 
and attempt an indirect route to vindication. The question is whether these indirect routes are 
up to the task of providing an effective legal route to protecting the human rights of workers 
against unjustified infringements by their employer. 
The main focus of this article will be the right, set out in the Employment Rights Act 
1996 (ERA 1996), against unfair dismissal. Claimants have already attempted to shape unfair 
dismissal law with human rights concerns,10 suggesting that it will be the favoured instrument 
chosen for litigation of this kind. Under the HRA 1998, the courts and tribunals are included 
as public authorities that must act compatibly with the Convention in section 6(3) and further, 
under section 3, they must interpret domestic statutes in a manner that is compatible with the 
Convention as far as it is possible to do so. Although the criticisms made below relate solely 
to the law of unfair dismissal, many of the comments are equally applicable to other areas of 
                                                           
7 The principles of freedom of expression that apply in circumstances of whistleblowing are set out in 
Guja v Moldova (2011) 53 EHRR 16 at [72]-[79] and Heinisch v Germany (2014) 58 EHRR 31 at 
[63]-[70].  
8 See, in particular, TULR(C)A 1992, section 137 relating to refusal of employment on grounds 
related to trade union membership, and sections 146 and 152 protecting workers from detriment or 
dismissal on grounds related to trade union memberships.  
9 Benkharbouche v Embassy of the Republic of Sudan; Janah v Libya [2015] EWCA Civ 33, [2015] 3 
WLR 301 at [73]-[81].  
10 See X v Y, n. 3 above, Pay v Lancashire Probation Service, n. 3 above, and Turner v East Midlands 
Trains Ltd [2012] EWCA Civ 1470, [2013] ICR 525.  
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labour law such as the common law of the contract of employment, which rely on similar legal 
concepts and seem to be similarly narrow in scope or limp in their protection for human rights.  
It must be admitted that the law of unfair dismissal was not introduced in order to 
vindicate the human rights of workers. The legislation was intended to protect employees 
against unfair disciplinary action and to provide a mechanism for the peaceful resolution of 
disputes.11  However, the function of vindicating fundamental rights is in line with Hugh 
Collins’ interpretation of the foundations of unfair dismissal law as demonstrating a ‘concern 
for the protection of individual rights in the workplace’, particularly ‘the protection of 
autonomy and dignity against the potential for abuse of bureaucratic power.’12 The concern 
that the employer’s managerial power should not be used in a manner that offends the dignity 
and autonomy of workers is reflected by international human rights documents, such as the 
European Social Charter13 and the EU’s Charter of Fundamental Rights,14 which include the 
right of workers to protection in dismissal, particularly the right that a dismissal should be for 
a legitimate and justifiable reason. In addition, the idea that the law of unfair dismissal should 
become a vehicle for the protection of the human rights of workers is mandated by the positive 
obligation placed upon members states by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) to 
protect individuals against an interference with their human rights by private individuals and 
                                                           
11 Royal Commission on Trade Unions and Employers' Associations Report (1968, Cmnd 3623).  
12 Hugh Collins, Justice in Dismissal: The Law of Termination of Employment (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1992) 272.  
13 Revised European Social Charter (3 May 1996, European Treaty Series No. 163), Article 24.   
14 The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union [2016] OJ C202/389, Article 30.  
One might use the text of Article 30 to critique the law of unfair dismissal. For example, one might 
note the difference in personal scope of the respective rights and further ask whether protecting from 
‘unjustified dismissal’ demands a higher standard of treatment that the domestic ‘unfair dismissal’? 
Whilst these are interesting issues, it is unlikely that a legal challenge framed in this way would be 
successful as the EU is yet to exercise its competence in the area of general individual dismissal 
protection. The challenge would therefore fail as unfair dismissal is not ‘implementing Community 
law’ and therefore the Charter is not applicable: see, for further detail, Catherine Barnard, ‘The 
Charter in time of crisis: a case study of dismissal’ in Nicola Countouris and Mark Freedland (eds), 
Resocialising Europe in a Time of Crisis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), C-488/21 
Sándor Nagy v Hajdú-Bihar Megyei Kormányhivatal [2013] OJ C79/3 and Benkharbouche v Embassy 
of the Republic of Sudan; Janah v Libya, n. 9 above, at [74].  
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organisations.15 Many European states, including the UK on a number of occasions,16 have 
accepted that this positive duty entails that human rights have a strong influence upon private 
law, which has been termed ‘strong indirect horizontal effect’.17 Thus, courts should usually 
reach a decision in disputes between a worker and their employer that respects the human rights 
of both parties.18   
The aim of this article is to expose the limitations upon the capacity of unfair dismissal 
to vindicate the human rights of workers. There are extensive gaps in the protection that it 
provides, leaving many private sector employees without an avenue to gain protection for their 
rights. The examination will be divided into three parts. In section 2, a prominent problem and 
an initial obstacle for claimants attempting to use an unfair dismissal claim to launch a human 
rights complaint will be considered: the narrow personal scope of protection provided by unfair 
dismissal law. Human rights are available universally to all persons, as indicated in Article 1 
of the Convention. If the mechanism of unfair dismissal is to prove an effective means of 
vindicating one’s human rights, therefore, the cause of action should be similarly available 
universally across the workforce.19 Section 2 will highlight the points at which the personal 
scope of unfair dismissal law fails to meet this requirement. I will concentrate upon the 
                                                           
15 See the ECtHR judgment in Redfearn v United Kingdom (2013) 57 EHRR 2 at [43], [50], [52] and 
[57]. 
16 See for example Campbell v MGN Ltd [2004] UKHL 22, [2004] 2 AC 457 and X v Y, above n. 3; 
although these cases might be compared with the view expressed in McDonald v McDonald [2016] 
UKSC 28, [2017] AC 273 at [40]-[47] that Parliament had already balanced the competing interests 
involved in a repossession case. Therefore, courts are not required to consider the proportionality of 
granting a possession order in each particular case.  
17 See Alison Young, ‘Mapping Horizontal Effect’ in David Hoffman (ed), The Impact of the UK 
Human Rights Act on Private Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011) 42-44 and Gavin 
Phillipson, ‘The Human Rights Act, 'Horizontal Effect' and the Common Law: a Bang or a 
Whimper?’ (1999) 62 MLR 824, 830-831. 
18 See Hall and Preddy v Bull and Bull [2013] UKSC 73, [2013] 1 WLR 3741 at [41]-[55] for an 
example, in the context of service provision, of Lady Hale ensuring the outcome reached by applying 
anti-discrimination law struck a balance between the Article 9 rights of Christian hoteliers and the 
Article 8 rights of a gay couple who were refused a double room.  




approach of the domestic and Strasbourg courts towards individuals participating in non-
standard working arrangements, who are not entitled to the right not to be unfairly dismissed 
but are protected by the Convention. The third section will examine the standard of review in 
unfair dismissal. When compared to the stringent scrutiny applied by the ECtHR through its 
proportionality analysis, the ‘range of reasonable responses’ test is inadequate. The ‘range of 
reasonable responses’ test permits extreme deference to the employer’s judgment and often 
entirely misses glaring infringements of a worker’s human rights. Where an infringement is 
noticed, the proportionality element that has been inserted into the review process is applied 
half-heartedly and rarely in favour of the claimant. In the fourth section, I will question whether 
the remedies available to claimants after a successful unfair dismissal claim are sufficient to 
vindicate the infringement of their human rights.  
2.  LIMITED PERSONAL SCOPE OF UNFAIR DISMISSAL  
The focus of this section will be the scope of protection offered by unfair dismissal law. Every 
human being is entitled to protection of their human rights.20 For unfair dismissal to be an 
effective vehicle for the defence of those rights, its personal scope should be similarly 
universal.  
A. The barriers to an unfair dismissal claim 
Unfortunately, however, the protection of unfair dismissal law is available only to a narrow 
class of individuals in the workforce. There are four requirements that individuals must fulfil 
in order to pursue an unfair dismissal claim, each with the potential to deny claimants access 
to judicial review of their employer’s decision to dismiss.  
                                                           
20 For a more general discussion of the impact of a human rights perspective on the personal scope of 
employment law, see Collins and Mantovalou, ibid.  
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(1) The requirement that there must be a contract between the dismissing entity and the 
individual.  
(2) This contract must be enforceable – i.e. not tainted by illegality, affected by diplomatic 
immunity or unenforceable through some other rule of general contract law.  
(3) The contract must not be within a category excluded by the Employment Rights Act 
1996 (ERA 1996) – an independent contractor’s bargain or a contract regarding an 
occupation listed by the ERA 1996.21  
(4) The individual must have completed the qualifying period of service with the relevant 
employer.22  
I will discuss briefly the first, second and fourth requirements before considering the third in 
more detail.  
The first requirement particularly impacts upon agency workers. They are caught in a 
triangular arrangement under which they have a contract with their agency, who supplies the 
worker’s services under a separate contract with the end user. There is no express contract 
between worker and end user and the courts have refused to imply a contract between those 
parties in most circumstances.23 Because of this lack of a contractual link, if the end user takes 
the decision to terminate the engagement, the agency worker has no right under section 94 ERA 
against the end user. This prevents an estimated 1-1.5 million agency workers in the UK from 
gaining the protection of unfair dismissal law, even where a breach of their human rights has 
arguably taken place.24 For example, Mr Muschett in Muschett v HMPS was denied a claim for 
                                                           
21 Employment Rights Act 1996, sections 199, 200 and 230(2).  
22 Ibid, section 94.  
23 James v Greenwich London Borough Council [2008] EWCA Civ 35, [2008] ICR 545. 
24 This gap in protection for agency workers is not unique to unfair dismissal law: in Smith v Carillion 
(JM) Ltd [2015] EWCA Civ 209, [2015] IRLR 467, Mr Smith was found to lack a contract between 
himself and the entity that was responsible for blacklisting him, with the result that he could not make 
claims under TULR(C)A 1992 and ERA 1996. Alan Bogg comments that the decision ‘constitutes a 
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the alleged race discrimination that he suffered due to the lack of a contract between himself 
and the end user, the Prison Service.25 The ECtHR, in contrast, has no difficulty providing 
protection in triangular employment arrangements, such as Martinez v Spain where the 
claimant was selected by the Church but provided his services to a local school. The Court 
analysed the interference with the complainant’s Article 8 rights, despite the unusual nature of 
his position and that the breach with his rights was arguably perpetrated by two parties jointly.26  
The second requirement – the need for an enforceable contract – operates to deprive 
workers who are already in a vulnerable position in the UK of the opportunity to use unfair 
dismissal law to challenge their employer’s conduct. Two groups of claimants have come to 
the fore recently in the case law. The first are workers whose contracts may be tainted with 
illegality due to their irregular migration status.27 It is hoped, however, that the Supreme 
Court’s revised approach to the illegality defence set out in Patel v Mirza has improved the 
position of many of these workers. As the new approach is based upon public policy 
considerations and a proportionality assessment,28 there is every chance that denying an unfair 
dismissal claim grounded upon a human rights infringement would be considered 
disproportionate in all but the most extreme cases of illegality. This brings the UK closer to the 
position of the ECtHR on matters of illegality, but in those exceptional cases, we would still 
be out of step, as in the ECtHR the legality of the claimant’s actions or status are almost never 
relevant.29 The second group of workers affected by this requirement are those who are 
employed by an entity covered by the State Immunity Act 1978, which preserves immunity for 
                                                           
signal failure to protect the claimant's fundamental rights at common law’: Alan Bogg, ‘Common 
Law and Statute in the Law of Employment’ (2016) 69 CLP 67, at 109. 
25 Muschett v HM Prison Service [2010] EWCA Civ 25, [2010] IRLR 451.  
26 Martínez v Spain (2015) 60 EHRR 3. 
27 See Hounga v Allen and another (Anti-Slavery International intervening) [2014] UKSC 47, [2014] 
1 WLR 2889 and Alan Bogg and Sarah Green, ‘Rights Are Not Just for the Virtuous: What Hounga 
Means for the Illegality Defence in the Discrimination Torts’ (2015) 44 ILJ 101.  
28 Patel v Mirza [2016] UKSC 42, [2016] 3 WLR 399, at [120] per Lord Toulson.  
29 See Siliadin v France (2006) 43 EHRR 16.  
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‘proceedings concerning the employment … of the members of a consular post’.30 The position 
of workers in Embassies in the UK came under scrutiny in Benkharbouche v Embassy of the 
Republic of Sudan, in which two claimants launched a range of complaints, including unfair 
dismissal.31 The Court of Appeal held that the failure to allow these workers to access a tribunal 
was in breach of Article 6 ECHR and Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
EU. The claims based upon EU were permitted to progress on the basis of the direct effect of 
EU, but the unfair dismissal claims were rejected, subject to the court’s Declaration of 
Incompatibility under the HRA 1998. Although the number of workers employed by Embassies 
and other diplomatic services may be small, their inability to challenge poor treatment through 
labour law claims is a serious issue and leaves them exposed to harsh conduct, possibly 
including human rights infringements.32  
Finally, the individual must have completed a qualifying period of service with their 
employer before they become entitled to the right not to be unfairly dismissed. This gap in 
protection was criticised by the ECtHR in Redfearn v UK, in which the claimant, a driver, was 
dismissed as a result of his election to local government on behalf of a controversial political 
party. The Court held that the UK had a positive duty under Article 11 to protect employees 
from dismissal on the grounds of their political belief and this extended to all employees, 
regardless of their length of service.33 The UK government responded to this criticism by 
introducing a minor amendment to the operation of the qualifying period: it no longer applies 
to dismissals in which the reason for dismissal was the employee’s political opinions or 
affiliations.34 This change brings the UK into line with the letter of the Strasbourg dicta. As has 
                                                           
30 State Immunities Act 1978, section 16(1)(a). 
31 Benkharbouche v Embassy of Sudan, above n. 9.  
32 Ms Janah, employed by the Libyan Embassy in London, for example, brought claims of race 
discrimination and harassment, indicating that her employer may have breached her human rights in 
several instances.  
33 Redfearn v United Kingdom, above n. 15, at [57] 
34 Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013, section 13.  
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been observed by Hugh Collins and Virginia Mantouvalou, however, the Court’s reasoning in 
Redfearn ‘is equally applicable to all Convention rights that create positive obligations on 
parties to the Convention’35 which currently includes Article 8’s right to respect for private life, 
Article 9 on freedom of religion and Article 10’s freedom of expression.  The Court has 
previously transferred its reasoning between Articles 8, 9, 10 and 11,36 so it is very likely that 
the positive obligations as phrased and applied in Redfearn under Article 11 would be similarly 
applicable to those other articles. Thus, the remaining scope of applicability of the qualifying 
period leaves serious deficits in protection in circumstances where other ECHR articles may 
be breached, which may be incompatible with other Convention rights. 
B. Who is an employee?  
This section will compare the ECtHR approach to issues of personal scope to that of UK labour 
law under unfair dismissal law. The question for the English courts is whether the individual 
is an employee under a contract of service, entitled to protection under sections 94 and 230 
ERA 1996, or a business person offering their work under a contract for services. Comparably, 
with regard to Article 11 and entitlement to the special aspects of freedom of association 
available only to trade unions such as the right to collectively bargain37 and the right to strike,38 
the question for the Strasbourg court is whether the complainant is providing their services in 
the context of an employment relationship.39  
We might contrast an ECtHR decision with the English Court of Appeal’s findings in 
two domestic cases to demonstrate the divergence in approach to these questions. In Sindicatul 
Păstorul cel Bun v Romania, the Court was required to ascertain whether a group of clergymen 
                                                           
35 Collins and Mantouvalou, ‘Redfearn v UK: Political Association and Dismissal’, above n. 1, 915. 
36 See for example Eweida and others v United Kingdom, above n. 2, at [83].  
37 Demir v Turkey (2009) 48 EHRR 54.  
38 National Union of Rail, Maritime and Transport Workers v United Kingdom (2015) 60 EHRR 10.  
39 Sindicatul Păstorul cel Bun v Romania (2014) 58 EHRR 10, at [141]. 
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and lay members of the Romanian Orthodox Church were in an employment relationship, such 
that their association might be entitled to protection as a trade union under Article 11. The 
Court drew two points from the materials of the International Labour Organisation.40 First, it 
found that the existence of an employment relationship should be determined by a 
consideration of the facts, rather than how the relationships is characterised by any agreement 
between the parties. Second, the ILO states that workers have the right to establish collective 
organisations without any distinction. The Court went on to find that the duties carried out by 
the union’s members had many of the ‘characteristic features of an employment relationship’.41 
The Bishop appointed the individuals and set out their rights and obligations. Under his 
leadership, they carried out their assigned tasks, being paid by the Church or through state 
funds. Employer’s tax contributions were paid by the Church and the individuals were entitled 
to the same range of welfare and social security benefits as ordinary employees. The ‘special 
features’ of their work - the spiritual purpose of their role and the heightened duty of loyalty to 
which the clergymen were subject – were not sufficient to remove the individuals from the 
scope of Article 11’s protection. Here, it seems that the ECtHR’s starting point was that all 
individuals should be entitled to protection as workers within a trade union,42 and to support 
this assumption, the Court looked for points of similarity with a standard employment 
relationship, rather than differences. The ECtHR’s holistic and untechnical assessment 
examined the true essence of the relationship, a sharp contrast to the equivalent process in 
domestic law.  
There are two particular points of contrast with the domestic perspective on issues of 
personal scope. The first is how differently the courts deal with non-standard working 
                                                           
40 Ibid, at [142].  
41 Ibid, at [143].  
42 See ibid at [145]: ‘the question to be determined is rather whether such special features are 
sufficient to remove the relationship between members of the clergy and their church from the ambit 
of Article 11.’ 
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relationships, with religious officials here serving as the example. Sindicatul Păstorul can be 
compared with the Court of Appeal’s decision in Sharpe v Bishop of Worcester.43 Mr Sharpe 
was a parish rector who claimed constructive unfair dismissal after making a disclosure that he 
considered to be in the public interest. As a rector for the Church of England, his working 
relationship shared many of the unusual features with the priests’ employment above. Despite 
this, the Court of Appeal reached the opposite conclusion on whether Mr Sharpe’s working 
relationship merited the protection of labour law.44 Crucial in Lady Justice Arden’s decision 
was the lack of any intention to create legal relations and that there was no need to imply a 
contract because Mr Sharpe’s role was carried out in accordance with the terms of his office 
which were defined by law.45 With regard to whether Mr Sharpe was an ‘employee’, her 
Ladyship noted that he was not paid a wage directly from his employer and that the Bishop, 
his ‘manager’, had very few disciplinary processes easily available to him.46 These factors led 
Lady Justice Arden to the conclusion that Mr Sharpe was not an employee entitled to bring an 
unfair dismissal claim. The focus on technical doctrines of contract law and the minutiae of Mr 
Sharpe’s working arrangement is notable in Sharpe, and the result shows a clear divergence of 
opinion with the ECtHR on the entitlement to rights protection of those outside the realms of 
standard employment relationships.  
As a whistleblower, Mr Sharpe would be considered under the ECHR to be protected 
by Article 10’s freedom of expression.47 This fact had no impact on the findings of the domestic 
courts. The courts’ lack of concern for the need to remedy a human rights infringement is the 
                                                           
43 Sharpe v Worcester Diocesan Board of Finance Ltd and another [2015] EWCA Civ 399, [2015] 
ICR 1241. 
44 For a more detailed analysis of Sharpe, see ACL Davies, ‘The Employment Status of Clergy 
revisited: Sharpe v Bishop of Worcester’ (2015) 44 ILJ 551. 
45 Sharpe v Bishop of Worcester, above n. 43 at [44]-[47]. Her Ladyship used these observations to 
deny that Mr Sharpe had any contract at all with the Diocese, in much the same way as the courts 
refuse to imply a contract between agency worker and end user.  
46 Ibid, at [85]-[89]. 
47 See Guja v Moldova, above n. 7, and Heinisch v Germany, above n. 7. 
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second point of divergence with the ECtHR. In a similar way to Sindicatul Păstorul, the 
employer in O’Kelly v Trusthouse Forte took a hostile stance to their workers exercising their 
fundamental freedom to join a trade union and participate in its activities.48 The ECtHR has 
consistently demonstrated a determination that the protection of fundamental rights should be 
available and applicable as universally as possible.49 In contrast, the Court of Appeal in O’Kelly 
showed no anxiety over the fact that their decision that a group of ‘regular casual’ waiters were 
independent contractors would deprive the workers of any opportunity to challenge their 
dismissal, which was arguably a direct result of their activities as members of the Hotel 
Catering Workers Union. If O’Kelly were decided today by the ECtHR, it is almost certain that 
the employer’s actions would be considered an unjustified interference with the waiters’ Article 
11 rights and that the UK, in denying them the opportunity to challenge their dismissal, would 
have failed in its positive obligations to protect Article 11 rights in relations between private 
parties.  
This section has exposed a significant disparity between the scope of protection of 
unfair dismissal and the universality of ECHR rights. Further, the starting point of the 
international and domestic courts, and their subsequent approach to determining the 
employment status of an individual and their consequent entitlement to important rights, differ 
greatly. Dominated by technical legal tests of employment law and the details of contract law, 
the English approach narrowly confines the availability of unfair dismissal to traditional 
employment relationships whereas the ECtHR emphasises that human rights protection should 
be as broadly available as possible. This is just one part of the deeper problem exposed in 
Section 2. Any attempt to vindicate an individual’s human rights through the use of an unfair 
dismissal claim is at risk of falling at the first hurdle: gaining access to a tribunal to review 
                                                           
48 O'Kelly and Others v Trusthouse Forte Plc [1983] 3 WLR 605, [1984] QB 90. 
49 See Demir v Turkey, n. 37 above, at [97].  
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their case. This is incompatible with the universal aspirations of human rights law, and could 
certainly be the subject of a challenge under Article 6’s right to a fair trial, which includes a 
right to access a court for the determination of civil claims.50 The problem exposed in this first 
part, of not one but four possible barriers to getting a claim to court, amounts to the most 
fundamental challenge to the ability of unfair dismissal law to vindicate the human rights of 
claimants. Human rights arguments would test the basic assumption that employment law 
protection should be confined to a limited class of persons taking part in a particular kind of 
working relationship.51  
3. PROPORTIONALITY AND FAIRNESS: CONTRASTING STANDARDS OF 
REVIEW 
In contrast to the UK tribunals’ lack of concern to reconcile the personal scope of labour rights 
with the universality of human rights protection, there has been consideration of how the 
standard of fairness should be infused with the more stringent standard used in human rights 
law. Section 3 will question whether this reconciliation of two contrasting standards has been 
successful in practice or whether, in fact, claimants are left inadequately protected through the 
application of a lax standard of review of the employer’s infringement. First, this section will 
outline the standard of proportionality review used by the ECtHR, which requires that the 
infringing body demonstrates a legitimate reason that justifies their actions and balances a 
broad range of factors in the assessment of proportionality. Section 3 will then consider the 
domestic examination of fairness, under the guise of the ‘range of reasonable responses’. It will 
                                                           
50 See for example, the ECtHR’s disapproval of the striking out of negligence claims at the duty of 
care stage: Osman v United Kingdom (2000) 29 EHRR 245. The CFREU’s right to an effective 
remedy has been used to challenge rules – such as diplomatic immunity – that exclude workers from 
accessing a court and vindicating their rights: see Benkharbouche v Embassy of the Republic of 
Sudan; Janah v Libya, above n. 9. It could be an additional means to challenge the narrow scope of 
some labour law rights.  
51 Hugh Collins and Virginia Mantouvalou have considered how this clash of presumptions might 
affect the contours of labour law: Collins and Mantouvalou, ‘Human Rights and the Contract of 
Employment’, above n. 5, 199-200.  
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be demonstrated that, even with the addition of some proportionality-style analysis, the 
standard of review is insufficient to protect the human rights of workers in a manner consistent 
with the approach of the Strasbourg Court. Despite the declaration by the Court of Appeal of a 
clear framework for dealing with dismissal cases with human rights implications, the tribunals 
often neglect to apply it in circumstance where it would be appropriate. Further, the addition 
of a layer of proportionality considerations has not corrected the inclination of tribunals to find 
in favour of employers, accepting the employer’s assessment of the situation and whether a 
dismissal was a fair or proportionate response.   
A. The Convention’s standard of justification  
Under the qualified rights of the Convention, a defendant is permitted the opportunity to justify 
their infringing behaviour. This takes place under the second subsection of the relevant Article 
– here I am examining particularly Articles 8, 9, 10 and 11 which rely upon the application of 
a proportionality assessment. There are three elements to the justification process: 
1. The interference must be ‘prescribed by law’.   
2. The interference must pursue a ‘legitimate aim’. Included in the listed aims are 
national security and public safety, the protection of health and morals and the 
protection of the rights and freedoms of others. In cases of dismissal, employers often 
appeal to the right to protect their business’ reputation, which is within the scope of the 
latter aim.  
3. That the interference was ‘necessary in a democratic society’ – to determine this, the 
Strasbourg Court asks whether the interference was proportionate to the aim pursued. 
What does the Court consider relevant to a proportionality assessment in a case of dismissal? 
First, the Court has indicated that a dismissal will be not be a proportionate infringement of a 
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human right if a less severe course of action might have been available to the employer.52 The 
Court also considers dismissal a very serious form of interference with an individual’s human 
rights53 – the individual’s loss of livelihood and job security, the impact upon their personal 
life and reputation and the difficulty of getting a new job are all considerations for the Court. 
More generally, the ECtHR makes an assessment of the seriousness of the infringement: if the 
dismissal impacts upon the essence or core of the content of the right, the infringer will have 
to plead a very serious reason for the infringement and produce strong evidence of its 
necessity.54 The Court will also take into account the duty of loyalty owed to the employer, 
particularly in cases regarding civil servants.55 One point of criticism that might be levelled at 
the ECtHR is its failure to demand that the employer demonstrate that the claimant has created 
a real risk of damage to their reputation in the public sphere, which is sufficiently imminent to 
justify dismissing the individual. Without such a demonstrable risk, the requirement that the 
infringement pursue a legitimate aim is an empty one. In general, however, the ECtHR’s review 
of the justification of an infringement is focused on the harm done to the individual and 
ensuring that the employer had a sufficiently serious reason to interfere with their human rights.  
The proportionality test has been applied at varying degrees of intensity. Described 
above is the strictest examination process, used when the Court reviews a decision to dismiss 
an individual that is taken by the national authority itself.56 In this vertical case of infringement, 
the proportionality standard is at its most exacting. In a horizontal case, where the infringing 
party is private entity such an employer, the standard of review is different. As the tribunal 
with the closest contact with the facts of the case, the ECtHR considers national court to be 
                                                           
52 See Pay v United Kingdom (Admissibility Decision) (2009) 48 EHRR SE2, at 26 and Fuentes Bobo 
v Spain (2001) 31 EHRR 50 at [49]. 
53 Vogt v Germany (1996) 21 EHRR 205, at [60]; Schüth v Germany (2011) 52 EHRR 32, at [73]. 
54 Smith and Grady v United Kingdom (2000) 29 EHRR 493, at [90].  
55 Vogt v Germany, above n. 53, at [58] and Guja v Moldova, above n. 7, at [70]-[71]. 
56 See, for example, Vogt v Germany, above n. 53. 
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best placed to assess the necessity of the infringement and grants it a margin of appreciation in 
judging the proportionality of an interference. If the national court has struck a fair balance 
between the interests of the employer and the rights of the individual, its decision will be within 
the margin of appreciation and there will be no infringement of the applicant’s Convention 
rights.57 Which standard should the UK tribunals be held to – a full proportionality analysis or 
simply striking a fair balance between the interests at stake? I argue that the domestic tribunals, 
in reviewing the dismissal and its compatibility with a worker’s Convention rights through the 
vehicle of unfair dismissal law, are performing the same function as that of the ECtHR when 
deciding a vertical dismissal case – that of the first external reviewer of a decision. They must 
demand the employers produce a legitimate aim for the infringement, and conduct a full 
proportionality assessment, taking into account the range of factors outlined above. Such a 
process would ensure that the claimant’s Convention rights are properly protected, rather than 
permitting a derogation from those rights based on flimsy evidence or employer supposition.  
B. Fairness and the ‘range of reasonable responses’  
The statutory language of the ERA 1996 states that a dismissal will be fair if the employer 
acted reasonably in treating the reason submitted as a sufficient reason for dismissal.58 This has 
been judicially interpreted to mean that ‘if a reasonable employer might reasonably have 
dismissed him, then the dismissal was fair.’59 The ‘range of reasonable responses’ (RORR), in 
which reasonable employers might reasonably take different views, is crucial in determining 
whether a dismissal was fair or unfair. Importantly, the higher courts have repeatedly 
emphasised that tribunals must not enter a ‘substitution mindset’: ‘the employment tribunal 
should not put themselves in the place of management to decide whether they, the employment 
                                                           
57 Young, James and Webster v United Kingdom (1981) 3 EHRR 20 [162]; Fuentes Bobo v Spain, 
above n. 52, at [38] and Redfearn v United Kingdom, above n. 15, at [42]-[43].  
58 ERA 1996, section 98(4). 
59 British Leyland UK Ltd v Swift [1981] IRLR 91, 93 (Lord Denning MR).  
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tribunal members, would have dismissed the applicant or not’.60 David Cabrelli notes that the 
non-substitution principle deprives tribunals of the opportunity to ‘articulate what ought to 
have been done by the employer’.61 This is a key element of the proportionality assessment: 
the court’s ability to indicate to decision-makers that, for example, a less severe measure would 
have been more appropriate in the circumstances, on the basis of their objective assessment of 
the facts. 
This is only one disparity between the ‘range of reasonable responses’ test and the 
proportionality standard utilised in Strasbourg. The domestic courts do not attempt to weigh 
the seriousness of the harm inflicted upon the claimant and the infringement with their human 
right, against the aim purported to be pursued by the employer. Rather, the tribunal checks that 
the employer’s decision was in line with industry practice – essentially a check that other 
employers would have interfered with the claimant’s human rights in the same way – and if so, 
the dismissal is lawful. This offers inadequate protection to the human rights of workers in 
circumstances of dismissal, despite Lord Justice Mummery’s claim that ‘[c]onsiderations of 
fairness, the reasonable response of a reasonable employer, equity and  substantial merits 
ought, when taken together … to enable the employment tribunal to give effect to applicable 
Convention rights.’62 As argued by Hugh Collins and Virginia Mantouvalou, the focus of the 
proportionality test is much more on the impact of the interference upon the claimant, and 
ensuring the measure taken to protect the legitimate interests of the employer was as minimally 
intrusive as possible.63 This leads to much stronger scrutiny of an employer’s decision to 
                                                           
60 Beedell v West Ferry Printers [2000] IRLR 650, 656. See also Foley v Post Office, HSBC Bank plc 
v Madden [2000] ICR 1283, [2000] IRLR 827.  
61 David Cabrelli, ‘Rules and Standards in the Workplace: a Perspective from the Field of Labour 
Law’ (2011) 31 LS 21, 29. 
62 X v Y, above n. 3, at [59]  
63 Collins and Mantouvalou, ‘Redfearn v UK: Political Association and Dismissal’, above n. 1, 921.  
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dismiss, which cannot be replicated by the application of an unaltered ‘range of reasonable 
responses’ test.64  
In light of the inadequacies of the domestic standard of fairness when contrasted with 
the ECtHR’s proportionality test, it was almost inevitable that claimants would argue that the 
former was failing to protect their human rights affected by a dismissal. In X v Y, the claimant 
received a caution for engaging in sex in a public toilet. He was dismissed after his employer 
discovered this, and that the claimant had failed to inform them of this situation. As he felt that 
the reason for his dismissal amounted to an infringement of his right to a private life under 
Article 8, he argued that the standard of fairness should be interpreted in light of the Convention 
and the tribunal should apply the proportionality test to ascertain whether the interference was 
justified. Lord Justice Mummery agreed that, if Article 8 were engaged upon the facts of the 
dismissal, then the tribunal should consider whether the interference was justified under Article 
8(2).65 In order to do this, Lord Justice Mummery directed tribunals to consider the 
proportionality analysis as part of their deliberations of fairness. Upon the facts of the case 
before him, however, the question of proportionality did not arise as his Lordship consider that 
Article 8 was not engaged by the reason for dismissal.66  
Has Lord Justice Mummery’s framework led to effective protection of Convention 
rights in dismissal cases which involve an infringement of human rights? Arguably, no. I would 
argue that surveying the cases decided since X v Y demonstrate that the standard of protection 
of human rights guaranteed through unfair dismissal law has not improved. There are two key 
                                                           
64 This also contradicts two other claims made regarding the two standards of review. In X v Y, Lord 
Mummery claimed that the RORR test would not reach a conclusion incompatible with the 
Convention and, second, in Turner v East Midlands, above n. 10, Lord Justice Elias argued that ‘[i]t 
may even be that the domestic band of reasonable responses test protects human rights more 
effectively’ than Strasbourg: at [56]. I disagree with both statements for the reasons outlined here.  
65 X v Y, above n. 3, at [56].  
66 Ibid, at [51]-[52]. This finding has been criticised by Virginia Mantouvalou in ‘Human Rights and 
Unfair Dismissal: Private Acts in Public Spaces’, above n. 3.  
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problems with the operation of the X v Y framework in practice. The first is that, despite clear 
human rights issues and possible infringements, in many cases, no attempt is made by the 
tribunals to apply Lord Justice Mummery’s framework. This means that human rights 
infringements go unconsidered and claimants do not receive proper protection of those rights. 
The second issue is that, if a human rights issue is raised, the tribunals fail to engage in thorough 
scrutiny of the decision of the employer, both in terms of the legitimacy of the aim pursued and 
in terms of the decision’s overall proportionality.  
C. Missing the point: the tribunals’ neglect of human rights issues 
GM Packaging Ltd v Haslem concerned a small packaging company for whom the claimant 
had worked for 14 years before the events took place.67 There were office rumours that Mr 
Haslem had been having a sexual relationship with a colleague, identified as LO. After a 
dispute between LO and the owner-manager of the company (GM), the manager saw the two 
parties engaged in sexual conduct on the company premises. These events occurred out of 
office hours. The next morning LO was dismissed. GM then challenged Mr Haslem about the 
incident and he admitted having an affair with LO, although he denied having sexual 
intercourse in the office. A recording also emerged later of Mr Haslem and LO speaking in 
derogatory terms about GM during the same incident. There was an investigatory meeting and 
following the meeting, Mr Haslem was dismissed. Ruling upon the appeal against the ET’s 
findings in Mr Haslem’s case for unfair dismissal, the EAT found that the reason for dismissal 
had been both the sexual activity between Mr Haslem and LO and their recorded conversation 
regarding GM. Applying only the standard ‘range of reasonable responses’ test, the EAT found 
the dismissal was fair.  
                                                           
67 GM Packaging (UK) Ltd v Haslem (2014) UKEAT/0259/13/LA.  
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Haslem demonstrates perfectly the first criticism of the standard of review in unfair 
dismissal cases: that a tribunal can reach a decision on a case and yet completely miss that a 
human rights infringement has occurred. There are two separate Article 8 points that could 
have been raised. One, which should have been glaringly obvious, is that the conduct involved 
formed part of Mr Haslem’s private life. To quote the ECtHR in Pay v United Kingdom, 
‘private life is a broad term not susceptible to exhaustive definition’ but it includes one’s sexual 
orientation and sexual life and one’s right to establish relationships with other human beings 
and the outside world.68 Further, the Court has stated that this protection for private life does 
not immediately cease upon entering a public space or working environment.69 The EAT gives 
no indication that Article 8 considerations had entered its deliberation at all, despite the 
claimant’s intimate relationship and its conduct in the office forming part of the reason for 
dismissal. A subtler Article 8 point is that of surveillance in the workplace. The conversation 
between Mr Haslem and LO regarding their manager was discovered because a recording 
device was left on in the office. The ECtHR has found on multiple occasions that surveillance 
in the workplace also engages the right to respect for one’s private life.70 The EAT did not 
examine at all whether the employer’s use of this material in disciplinary proceedings was 
legitimate – particularly in light of the lack of prior warning of workplace surveillance.71 Their 
conversation could have been within the scope of the right to freedom of expression under 
Article 10. Legitimate criticism of one’s employer or manager is protected, as is negative or 
offensive expression.72 The tribunals failed to recognise any of these potential interferences 
with Mr Haslem’s human rights in their application of the RORR.  
                                                           
68 Pay v United Kingdom, above n. 52, at 24.  
69 Niemietz v Germany (1993) 16 EHRR 97, at [29] and Pay v United Kingdom, ibid.  
70 Halford v United Kingdom (1997) 24 EHRR 523, 543; Köpke v Germany (2011) 53 EHRR SE26, at 
[37]-[38].  
71 Halford v United Kingdom, ibid, 543. 
72 Sánchez v Spain (2012) 54 EHRR 24, at [72]-[76]. 
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There are two possible responses to this concern. The first is that the tribunals should 
be criticised for failing to adhere to Lord Justice Mummery’s framework for dealing with cases 
in which human rights might be infringed.73 Haslem is arguably a case where proportionality 
would have reached a different conclusion to the ‘band of reasonable responses’. Although the 
dismissal was found to be fair, applying the justification under Article 8(2) may well have 
failed – particularly on the grounds that a lesser sanction may have been available. One 
difficulty is that the courts may consider it necessary for them to be prompted by the claimant 
to consider Article 8 or 10 arguments and be pointed towards the X v Y framework.  
An alternative way of resolving this criticism is by arguing that the separate framework 
propounded by Lord Justice Mummery should not be necessary. Infringing the human rights 
of worker should be outside the ‘range of reasonable responses’ available to an employer. Keith 
Ewing, for example, argued that an employer would not be acting reasonably in treating a 
reason that breaches a Convention right as a reason for dismissal.74 Such a change would mean 
that the claimant would not have to make specific arguments regarding a breach of their human 
rights. Instead, whether a human rights infringement has occurred as a result of, or during the 
process of, the dismissal would become another relevant factor in determining the shape and 
breadth of the ‘range of reasonable responses’.  This route to having regard to human rights in 
unfair dismissal cases may assist litigants in person particularly, who are unlikely to know that 
they need to raise ECHR arguments for the tribunal to take them into account. It is difficult to 
predict whether the tribunals would embrace this mode of reasoning but if they did so, it could 
trigger a dramatic change in the result of unfair dismissal cases.  
D. Lenient review in Laws 
                                                           
73 They might have been relying on the argument, made by Lord Justice Mummery and criticised 
above, that the RORR test and the proportionality test would usually reach the same result in most 
cases.  
74 Keith Ewing, ‘The Human Rights Act and Labour Law’ (1998) 27 ILJ 275, 288.  
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A different set of issues arose in Game Retail v Laws.75 The claimant was a risk investigator 
for the defendant retailer. As part of his duties, he created a Twitter account and formed online 
connections with accounts run by local stores of the defendant. His aim was to monitor any 
risks that may have been created from those accounts and the content they posted. Using the 
same account, he also formed Twitter connections with his own friends and acquaintances and 
communicated with them via Twitter outside of working hours. A year later, the employer 
became aware that the claimant had posted some offensive material on his Twitter account. 
During the investigation, the claimant voluntarily deleted his Twitter account. He was charged 
with gross misconduct on the grounds that his tweets were offensive, threatening and obscene 
and could be viewed by anyone, including the defendant’s employees and customers. The 
company dismissed him summarily.  
The ET found that the decision fell outside the range of reasonable responses. It 
considered that the primary purpose of the Twitter account was for Mr Laws to communicate 
outside of work on matters that did not relate to his work. He only used it in his own time and 
some of the offensive tweets he had explained further and their more innocuous meaning 
became clear. It also questioned the employer’s assumptions that the public had accessed his 
Twitter account and linked the claimant to the company as he did not mention his work or the 
company in his comments. In addition, the tribunal considered that it was unclear whether the 
company’s IT policies made it clear that inappropriate use of social media outside of working 
time could be considered gross misconduct.  
The EAT took a different view. Two factors were crucial. First, Mr Laws had not 
restricted his online settings so that only his acquaintances could see his comments – they were 
visible to anyone who looked at his account. Second, Mr Laws’ account was connected with a 
                                                           
75 Game Retail Limited v Laws, above n. 4. 
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large number of the defendant’s Twitter accounts with the consequence that his posts would be 
readily accessible to anyone using those accounts.76 They acknowledged that some balance 
must be drawn between an employer’s desire to reduce reputational risk stemming from social 
media and the employee’s right to freedom of expression.77 Although the tribunal noted that 
this was a case regarding private use of Twitter outside of working time and despite the fact 
that Mr Laws had taken immediate steps to remove the reputational risk to the employer, the 
court clearly viewed this case as an easy one. The EAT criticised the ET for focusing on what 
they considered to be relevant, rather than the view that a reasonable employer could take.78 
The same conclusion was reached on whether there was any offence actually caused – the 
employment judge had impermissibly substituted his own view of whether anyone had been 
offended.79 The case was remitted for another hearing.  
Laws can be criticised on three grounds. The EAT readily accepted that Mr Laws’ 
online activity posed an actual threat to the employer’s reputation. As Paul Wragg comments, 
‘the harm of the expression to the employer’s interests is often either assumed or otherwise 
ignored, as if it were an apparently unimportant consideration’.80 It is far from unimportant, 
however, as it is only this harm (or the risk of it occurring) that could justify labelling Mr Laws’ 
conduct as gross misconduct and form the legitimate aim for their infringement of his human 
rights. Instead of making a genuine attempt to assess the likelihood of harm being caused to 
the reputation or interests of Game Retail,81 the EAT accepted both the employer’s 
classification of his conduct as gross misconduct and its assertion that his actions were 
                                                           
76 Ibid, at [45].  
77 Ibid, at [46]. 
78 Ibid, at [47]. 
79 Ibid, at [49]. 
80 Wragg, above n. 4, 2. 
81 We can see that the Employment Tribunal did attempt to assess the likelihood of actual harm to the 
employer’s interests but received criticism for doing so as it strayed into the ‘substitution mindset’: 
Game Retail Limited v Laws, above n. 4, at [47]. 
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sufficiently harmful to justify the deprivation of Mr Laws’ livelihood. These findings are a 
result of the judicial deference to the view of the employer at the centre of the RORR test.82 
The tribunals have been deprived of the opportunity to make their own assessment of fairness 
in each case and to articulate the desired standard of treatment of workers,83 including the 
possibility of classifying some reasons – such an exercise of freedom of expression – as 
impermissible reasons for a dismissal. The standard of fairness has thus become reflective of 
the lowest common denominator of current employer practice, rather than a detailed analysis 
of the legitimacy of the employer’s reason to dismiss.  
The EAT’s approach in Laws also confirms the ‘dismissive treatment’ of ECHR rights 
in dismissal cases.84 In contrast to Haslem, the EAT mentioned Mr Laws’ ECHR right to 
freedom of expression. This mention, however, was not followed by any attempt to conduct a 
proportionality analysis in light of the ECHR’s requirements. The facts disclose a variety of 
considerations which could lead to the conclusion that the dismissal was a disproportionate 
interference with the claimant’s Article 10 rights. There was very little evidence that the 
company had sustained damage to their reputation and Mr Laws closed his Twitter account 
immediately. This removed any continuing risk to the company as the content could not be 
viewed or recovered from that point. The courts could equally have taken into account the 
likely chilling effect on workplace and off-duty expression in light of such a severe sanction 
being meted out to a colleague.85 It is at least arguable that a less severe sanction may have 
                                                           
82 Many authors have observed this: see for example Andy Freer, ‘The Range of Reasonable 
Responses Test - From Guidelines to Statute’ (1998) 27 ILJ 335 and ACL Davies, ‘Judicial Self-
restraint in Labour Law’ (2009) 38 ILJ 278. 
83 Patrick Elias, ‘Fairness in Unfair Dismissal: Trends and Tensions’ (1981) 10 ILJ 201, 213 and 
Davies, ‘Judicial self-restraint in labour law’, ibid, 293. 
84 Wragg, above n. 4, 7. 
85 This is a serious factor in the ECtHR’s proportionality considerations in Article 10 cases, see 
Heinisch v Germany, above n. 7, at [91]. 
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been appropriate, but the operation of the RORR test does not allow tribunals to consider such 
questions.  
One final point must be made in relation to the RORR in a human rights context. As 
Anne Davies has noted, proportionality has traditionally been a public law standard applied to 
government actors.86 Public administrators can be safely assumed to be putting their expertise 
towards working for the best outcome for society and this is ensured through various public 
law doctrines.87 She then points out that in labour law, we have no similar guarantees.88 There 
is ‘nothing to stop the employer from behaving entirely selfishly and using its expertise for its 
own benefit’.89 Such selfish behaviour could include disregarding or lacking respect for their 
workers’ human rights, which seemingly occurred in Haslem and Laws. This would suggest 
that the necessity and proportionality analysis in labour law should be stronger rather than 
weaker than the equivalent in public law. Instead, we find the tribunals being cautious and 
deferential to the employer’s view of the situation.  
As Astrid Sanders has noted, there has been ‘remarkable continuity’ between pre-HRA 
cases and more recent judicial statements.90 There is an ongoing reluctance to engage 
thoroughly with questions of human rights and disproportionate interferences. Although 
Mummery LJ set out a suggested approach over 10 years ago in X v Y, it has been little used. 
Laws and Haslem demonstrate that this is not because workplaces across the UK have become 
more respectful and considerate of the human rights of workers. Rather, it is because the courts 
and tribunals have continued the judicial ‘abnegation’ of responsibility to control the 
employer’s power to dismiss,91 despite continuous academic criticism and this continuation 
                                                           
86 Davies, ‘Judicial Self-restraint in Labour Law’, above n. 82, at 290. 
87 Ibid. 
88 Ibid. 
89 Ibid, 304. 
90 Sanders, above n. 3, 342.  
91 Collins, Justice in Dismissal, above n. 12, 29. 
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being contrary to the requirements of the HRA 1998 and the ECtHR’s established principles. 
Although Lord Justice Mummery’s approach introduced a proportionality analysis as a 
‘backstop’, this test appears to only come into play where the RORR test reaches a completely 
indefensible result. Most cases, such as Haslem and Laws, will be still be decided by an 
application of the deferential RORR test and left untouched by human rights considerations. 
Thus, there is a complete lack of any check that an interference with an individual’s human 
right can be justified by a legitimate aim and is proportionate to the pursuit of that aim. This 
section has proposed an alternative method of dealing with human rights issues in unfair 
dismissal cases, through which those rights would become engrained in the examination of 
reasonableness rather than an almost optional adjunct to the standard enquiry. Given the 
equally entrenched deference of the RORR test, one might fairly question whether even this 
modification would lead to the recalibration of unfair dismissal law that proportionality review 
seems to require.  
4.  THE REMEDIES FOR AN UNFAIR DISMISSAL  
The inadequacies of the remedies for a successful unfair dismissal claim are well-known. As 
mentioned above, both elements of financial compensation – the basic award under section 119 
and the compensatory award under section 123 – are subject to an upper limit.92 Non-pecuniary 
loss, such as injury to feelings and mental distress, is not recoverable.93 Tribunals can also 
reduce the award given to the claimant in three circumstances: where the claimant ‘caused or 
contributed to’ the employer’s decision to dismiss;94 a deduction to reflect the possibility that 
a fair dismissal would have occurred shortly afterwards;95 and the claimant may receive nothing 
                                                           
92 The Employment Rights (Increase of Limits) Order 2016, SI 2016/288 
93 See Norton Tool Co Ltd v Tewson [1973] 1 WLR 45 and Dunnachie v Kingston upon Hull City 
Council [2004] UKHL 36, [2005] 1 AC 226.  
94 ERA 1996, section 123(6).  
95 Polkey v AE Dayton Services Ltd [1987] 3 WLR 1153, [1988] AC 344 and Thornett v Scope [2006] 
EWCA Civ 1600, [2007] ICR 236, at [34]-[36].   
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at all if major misconduct upon their part is discovered after the dismissal.96 Are these general 
deficiencies problematic when viewed from the perspective of remedying an interference with 
human rights?  
The relevant ECHR articles are Article 13, which requires an effective remedy before 
a national authority for a breach of a Convention right, and Article 41, under which the Court 
affords ‘just satisfaction’ for an infringement of a Convention right. Article 13 has been little 
utilised, as the Court often does not examine an Article 13 complaint where a breach of another 
article has been established.97 Further, the aggregate collection of remedies available is 
examined by the Court, in the light of the margin of discretion available to the Member State,98 
making a successful complaint unlikely. Similarly, the application of Article 41 has not led to 
a clear set of remedial principles:99 The Court relies on a broad, ‘equitable assessment’ of the 
case under which the complainant should be returned to the position they would have been if 
the infringement had not occurred.100 So it is difficult to make a principled critique of the 
remedies of unfair dismissal law. Rather, we might compare what is included in the remedial 
‘package’ at domestic and ECHR level.  
Similar approaches appear to be taken to loss of earnings: it is recoverable through the 
compensatory award under the ERA 1996 and a lump sum is included in most cases in the 
ECtHR’s award.101 In addition, the ECtHR adds nuance to their findings through the 
application of Article 41: a large award indicates a particularly serious violation, whereas no 
award can express the Court’s disapproval of the complainant’s behaviour.102 The possibility 
                                                           
96 W Devis & Sons Ltd v Atkins [1977] 3 WLR 214, [1977] AC 931. 
97 See for example Redfearn v United Kingdom, above n. 15, at [61]-[63].  
98 Silver and others v United Kingdom (1983) 5 EHRR 347, at [19].  
99 See Luzius Wildhaber, ‘Article 41 of the European Convention on Human Rights: Just Satisfaction 
under the European Convention on Human Rights’ (2003) 3 Baltic Yearbook of International Law 1.  
100 Smith and Grady v United Kingdom (Just Satisfaction) (2001) 31 EHRR 24, at [18].  
101 Ibid, at [25].  
102 Wildhaber, above n. 99, 6, 12, 17.  
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of the complainant receiving no monetary compensation at all or a nominal amount in 
Strasbourg indicates that the ECtHR may not object to the domestic tribunals’ ability to reduce 
the award where the claimant contributed to their dismissal or committed gross misconduct. In 
contrast, I would argue the ‘Polkey deduction’, reflecting the possibility that a fair dismissal 
would have occurred soon after, would be unlikely to well-regarded by Strasbourg: if an 
unjustified interference with human rights has been committed, it should be irrelevant that the 
same events might have occurred lawfully at a later time.  
This leads to further points at which the remedies of unfair dismissal appear inadequate 
to provide ‘just satisfaction’ for a breach of unfair dismissal. The ECtHR has consistently 
shown that non-pecuniary damages are a crucial part of its remedial package under both Article 
41 and Article 13.103 In employment cases, the awards for non-pecuniary harm range from 
range from €2,000 for Mrs Eweida’s anxiety, frustration and distress104 to £19,000 each for Ms 
Smith and Mr Grady in light of the ‘profoundly destabilising events’ of having one’s private 
life investigated as well as the continuing emotional and psychological impact of those 
events.105 Linked to Smith and Grady, the ECtHR is willing to grant more generous awards to 
signal that the complainant has suffered a particular serious infringement.106 Domestic tribunals 
refuse to do the same.107 Taking into account the extensive recovery for financial losses, the 
opportunity to receive compensation for non-pecuniary damages and the possibility of an 
inflated award due to a finding of a grave infringement, it is easy to see how ‘just satisfaction’ 
in the ECtHR may go beyond the upper limit that has been placed upon the compensation for 
an unfair dismissal. Hugh Collins and Virginia Mantouvalou have questioned whether the 
                                                           
103 Edwards v United Kingdom (2002) 35 EHRR 19, at [99].  
104 Eweida and others v United Kingdom, above n. 2, at [114]. 
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106 See, for example, ibid.  
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statutory cap is compatible with effective protection of Convention rights108 - particular as there 
is no exception to the cap in cases where the claimant’s human rights have been infringed. An 
arbitrary limit on the amount that one can recover in such circumstances appears to be 
inconsistent with the ECtHR’s remedial approach.  
5.  CONCLUSION 
The aim of this article was to demonstrate that claimants face severe obstacles to vindicating 
their human rights through unfair dismissal law. Its personal scope is narrow, the standard of 
scrutiny of employer’s decisions is minimal, and the remedies deficient. As a result, many 
workers are left without a route to gaining protection for their human rights, or a proper remedy 
if they have been interfered with by their employer. Further, I would argue that the alterations 
required to fit unfair dismissal law to the pattern of the Convention rights are so extensive that 
not only are they very unlikely to occur either by judicial or legislative means but they would 
also reconstruct unfair dismissal to such an extent that it would no longer be the same legal 
structure. For example, consider the change that would be required to ensure that all those 
entitled to human rights receive protection through unfair dismissal law. Rather than the 
established category of the ‘employee’, or even the broader category of ‘worker’ used to scope 
some rights, every individual would have to have the right to make a claim against their 
employer. This would include semi-dependent workers and independent contractors, which 
have usually been considered to be beyond the bounds of labour law’s protection. Correcting 
the inadequacy of unfair dismissal law’s personal scope would amount to such a fundamental 
alteration to the core of the cause of action that it would be questionable to say the result 
maintained continuity with ‘unfair dismissal law’. A similar point could be made regarding 
reshaping the ‘fairness’ test around the proportionality formulae. We might conclude therefore 
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that not only is unfair dismissal law incapable in its current form to protect the human rights of 
workers, but also to perform this task the reform would have to be extensive and would alter 
the essence of the cause of action completely.  
Is there an alternative route to vindicating the human rights of workers? It has been 
suggested that implied terms could be developed to ensure that employers are required to 
respect the human rights of their workers.109 Although this may be an appealing idea which 
does not require the legal contortions outlined above, the judicial insistence that implied terms 
do not apply to the employer’s decision to dismiss would be a major stumbling block on this 
route. In Johnson v Unisys, the House of Lords held that the term of mutual trust and confidence 
– which under this suggestion would be extended to include a requirement that employers 
respect the human rights of their workers – cannot be invoked to gain compensation for a 
dismissal.110 It might be a useful tool for workers who suffer detriment connected to their 
human rights that fall short of dismissal, but this possibility appears to closed for claimants 
who suffer the most severe infringement with their human rights. An argument might be made 
that an extension of the implied terms of the employment contract is necessitated by the positive 
obligations placed upon the UK by the ECHR, in light of the inadequacies of the existing 
standard of protection of human rights in the workplace, but further work is required to 
determine how successful this argument would be when opposed with strong claims regarding 
the division of power between Parliament and the courts, which was the linchpin of many of 
the arguments in Johnson.  
To conclude, there appears to be no straightforward path to vindicating human rights 
that are infringed in the course of the employment relationship, or by its termination. Unfair 
                                                           
109 Hugh Collins and Virginia Mantouvalou considered this possibility in their chapter in the Contract 
of Employment and similarly doubted its likelihood: Hugh Collins and Virginia Mantouvalou, 
‘Human Rights and the Contract of Employment’, n. 5 above, 206-207.  
110 Johnson v Unisys Ltd [2001] UKHL 13, [2003] 1 AC 518.  
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dismissal’s protection is only available to a limited class of claimants and the infringement 
would have to be obvious and egregious for the court’s attention to be properly drawn to the 
requirements of proportionality that must be applied to ensure the claimant’s rights are 
protected. Another possibility is expanding the terms implied into the contract, and to bring a 
suit based on an interference with human rights through wrongful dismissal. Here, principled 
constitutional objections arise, limiting the potential of this route to enforcing human rights in 
the workplace. Claimants, particularly those in the private sector, are thus left exposed to 
breaches of their human rights perpetrated by employers which will continue to go uncorrected 
and un-remedied in the courts.  
